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1 Introduction' 
International macroeconomic policy coordination is high on the agenda for debate among 
policymakers and academie economists. Events that recently attracked much attention are the 
summits of the Group of Seven industrial countries and the cooperation between the central banks 
on exchange-market intervention. Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that the EMU-Treaty 
agreed in Maastricht (if ratified by the national parliaments) can only be accomplished by 
intensified coordination and closer cooperation between the EC countries. The main advantage of 
policy coordination is that, provided policymakers agree on the model of how the world economy 
behaves, countries will be better off if they coordinate plans, rather than setting their individual 
policies independently from each other, while taking the policies of the other govemments as given 
(i.e.,a Nash-equilibrium). 
Economie relations in society can be represented by a complex system of several decision-
units (e.g.,countries) rather than a single one. We can distinguish between the followingtwo cases. 
In the first case, the decision-units operate entirely independently from each other. This system is 
characterized by purely decentralized control in which each country follows an isolationistic policy. 
In the second case, decision-units aim for coordination in some sense. In this respect, one 
can establish coordination in two ways. In the first way coordination is a round-table agreement, 
for example discussing G7 cooperative strategies, to adjust each country's policy. A second way of 
macroeconomic policy coordination, however, is by means of a supranational coördinator (e.g., the 
Council of Ministers within the EC). Here, coordination is embodied in a separate policy-maker. 
We call this type of policy coordination hierarchical control. So far, the implications of an 
(independently) acting coördinator have not been explored. Macroeconomic policy coordination has 
been concerned almost exclusively with "intergovernmental" coordination (see e.g.,Bryant et al, 
1988,1989). 
In this paper we will analyze empirically the coordination among economies with a separate 
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coördinator, using elements of hierarchical optimal control theory in a linear quadratic framework. 
Hierarchical control theory has been applied in other disciplines: computer networks, (artificial) 
neural networks, production processes, enterpreneurial organizations, ecological (including water 
control) systems (see IMACS 13 * World Congress, 1991). In economics hierarchical control theory 
was introduced by Ito (1988, 1989), Ito & De Zeeuw (1989) and Ito, Plasmans, De Zeeuw, Cervio 
Pinho and Markink (1991). The present paper builds on these papers. A hierarchical structure can 
be seen as a pyramid, with the coördinator in the vertex (higher level) and the subsystems in the 
base of it (lower level). In our hierarchical control framework the coördinator adjusts the actions 
of the subsystems at the lower level in order to achieve an overall objective, whereas the subsys-
tems aim at their own individual objectives. The subsystems may have common objectives in favour 
or against the coördinator, or may have competing objectives. According to the underlying 
econometrie model (see Ito et al., 1991), the coordinator's target variables influence the dynamic 
development of the target variables in the subsystems. 
We will use this framework to describe the policy-making process in the European 
Community. We consider a single policy-maker (i.e., the Council of Ministers together with the 
European Commission) who tries to coordinate the individual macroeconomic policies of the 
subsystems (i.e., the EC countries) in order to steer the economy of the system (the European 
Community) towards a more desirable state. The rationale for applying this hierarchical approach 
to the EC is threefold. 
First, if one tries to model the EC-decision-making process one has to bear in mind that the 
Community shows some clear federal treats; it has developed its own system of laws and its 
institutions exercise a clearly defined authority in several areas (Molle, 1991). Applying a hierarchi-
cal approach appears thus in accordance with the stratified structure of the EC. 
The second reason to introducé hierarchical elements is related to stage three of EMU. 
There is strong evidence for substantial (net) benefits of one money in Europe (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1990a)2. Although the United Kingdom and Denmark did not make a 
commitment in the EMU Treaty to move automatically to stage three3, all EC countries did 
commit themselves to follow the appropriate policies to achieve convergence "in inflation rates, 
interest rates, budget deficits and other macroeconomic indicators (see EMU Treaty, 1991). As a 
consequence, countries have to submit convergence programs to the Council of Minsters. In these 
programs each country will have to show in what way it will meet the criteria for admission to 
stage three. However, this commitment to converge is not enforceable by law. The only instrument 
2
 See for opposing views Bank for International Settlements (1992) and Martin Feldstein 
(1992). 
3
 As is well known, the Danish people rejected this Treaty by referendum on June 2, 1992. 
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which the Gouncil has in the run up to stage three is to make (public) recommendations to the 
member state concerned if its economie policy is not consistent with the convergence tests. As a 
result, there is no guarantee that the EMU will start with as many qualified countries. Therefore, 
Europe might suffer a welfare loss the longer the convergence process will take. It is precisely in 
this respect that a separate coördinator might keep up the pace in this process by pursuing an 
overall macroeconomic policy consistent with stage three of EMU. In particular we are interested 
in the question which role the coördinator has to perform in the transition to the final stage of 
EMU. In this respect, the hierarchical coordination approach can be considered as an alternative 
to the present intergovernmental macroeconomic coordination strategy to aim for one money, 
which gives the Community institutions a merely advisory role. 
Third, following the distinction of Currie et al. (1989), coordination can take an absolute or 
a relative form 2. Our approach captures both. We assume there is a separate institution who 
takes care for macroeconomic performance (e.g. price stability) of the aggregate. This is in striking 
contrast with the Bretton Woods era when international coordination took the relative form 
(Currie et al, 1989). 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, hierarchical elements within the 
European Community will be discussed. In section 3, the theoretical framework for hierarchical 
optimal control is presented. We will apply this framework on an estimated macroeconomic model 
for the European Community in section 4. The results for the optimization procedure will be 
discussed in section 5. In section 6 two alternative economie policy scenario's are presented. 
Section 7 concludes. Details of optimal results are given in the appendices. 
2 Hierarchy within the EC 
The EC is a unique political institution (Collins, 1990). It is therefore helpful to take a brief look 
inside the current working of the key Community institutions 3. 
A major role in this process is played by the Council of Ministers, which consists of 
2
 Absolute coordination covers the overall stance of policy in the leading industrial countries 
and seeks to ensure that, in pursuing separately their own interests, countries do not, in the 
aggregate adopt excessively tight or loose policies for the world as a whole (Currie et al., 
1989 p. 15). Relative coordination, on the other hand, is concerned with the relative 
positions of countries and therefore focuses on eschange rates and balances of payments. 
3
 In doing so we deliberately abstract from the functioning of the European Parliament and 
the Court of Justice, because these are for our purpose less relevant. 
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representatives of the govemments of member states. According to the treaties, the Council's first 
concern is to coordinate the economie policy of the member states. The Council has furthennore 
been given the power to take decisions, i.e.,it has the final say in Community legislation. Finally, 
the Council is competent to regulate the Community's relations with other countries A. 
Since the Single European Act, the so-called European Council has also formally been part 
of the EC institutional machinery. It consists of the heads of govemments and the French head of 
state. Since the 1960s this institution has developed from the "European Summits". The European 
Council meets twice a year for the purpose of elaborating any strategie decisions. 
Within the European Community, another major role is played by the European Commissi-
on. A very important function of the European Commission is to initiate policies. In general, it is 
the sole institution allowed to propose Community regulations and directives 5. In this way, the 
working of the EC depends for a substantial part upon the activity of the Commission, because the 
Council of Ministers can only act, in a fonnal sense, on proposals from the Commission. To fulfill 
this role effectively, the Commission is represented in the meetings of the Council. Although it has 
no voting rights in Council meetings, the Commission can perform a mediatory function between 
national viewpoints and the general EC interest (Collins, 1990). 
A further important function of the Commission is to act as a guardian of the treaties. 
Because it is of vital importance that EC mies are actively applied in each member state, the 
Commission is responsible for the enforcement of Community law. To this end, it supervises the 
correct implementation of treaties and decisions 6. 
Finally, the Commission is executing Community policy. In this respect, it negotiates on 
behalf of the EC, for example in matters relating to international trade 7. 
In sum, the Council coordinates and determines the strategy to be adopted while the Commission 
takes care of daily operations and supervises the observation of the treaties. Both bodies need each 
4
 Actually, it is mostly the European Commission which acts as a negotiator for the EC, by a 
mandate given to it by the Council; the final decision is the Council's (Molle, 1991). 
5
 For example, it was the Commission who came up in 1985 with the well-known Cockfield 
White Paper to complete the internal market. This end is to be achieved by doing radically 
away with all existing barriers among EC member states by the end of 1992. 
6
 If, for instance, firms violate repeatedly EC rules, the Commision has the power to fine 
them. Should that remain without result, it is entitled to refer the matter to the Court of 
Justice. 
7
 The Commission also has substantial competences in matters relating to coal and steel, 
competition and nucleair energy. Further it implements the Community budget including 
that of the so-called structural Funds. However, a great deal of EC policy (e.g. the day-to-
day execution of the Common Agricultural Policy) is not executed by the Commission but by 
national and regional administrations. 
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other of course and, in fact, they perform their duties in constant consultation (Molle, 1991). 
Behind this description lies of course a very complex decision-making process, where more 
parties are involved. There is, however, little doubt that, in relation to the formulation and 
implementation of policy, the two key units are the Council of Ministers and the European 
Commission. Hence, for simplicity reasons we will treat the Council and the Commission within 
our hierarchical framework as one entity (henceforth called the Council). 
It is important at this stage to note that the Council together with the Commission is not a 
macroeconomic authority (VanderWal, 1991). It certainly has ambitious goals (Commission of the 
European Conununities, 1990b), but the instruments to reach them lag behind. Because we apply 
hierarchical control theory to the EC's policy-making process, we assume some macroeconomic 
instruments are available at the coordinator's level. Altough this is a rather strong assumption, 
there is little doubt there will be more hierarchical coordination in the near future. According to 
the EMU Treaty, the second stage of Economie and Monetary Union will be marked by the 
erection of a new umbrella organization called the European Monetary Institute 8. The hierarchy 
becomes even stronger in the full monetary union when member states with e.g. persistent 
excessive government deficits face Community sanctions (EMU Treaty, 1991, art. 104 §11). 
Obviously, modelling a complex decision-making unit as the EC is a cumbersome job and it 
is almost inevitable to make (sometimes severe) simplifying assumptions. Moreover, it is beyond 
dispute that economie coordination, as has generally occurred in history, has been a looser and 
more partial affair than analyzed in the theoretical literature (Currie et al, 1989). In view of these 
remarks we give an interpretation of EC policy-making within the hierarchical optimal control 
framework below. 
Based on the signals from the individual countries the Council is confronted with a number 
of target variables as well as desired values for them (we will describe beneath four ways how these 
desired values might come about). These target variables satisfy, of course, economie relationships 
determined by the development of these variables in the individual countries. Assuming that the 
importance of each country can be measured by its gross domestic product (GDP), we collect data 
that are weighted by the GDP of the individual countries to come to a realistic model for the 
target variables on EC-level. This model contains as well the instruments as the exogenous 
deterministic variables of the individual countries. So, based on this model for the target variables 
The EMI shall contribute to the realization of the conditions necessary for the move to the 
third stage. lts tasks are among others: 
to strenghten the coordination of monetary policy with a view to ensure price stability; 
take over the tasks of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund; 
to hold and manage foreign exchange reserves as an agent for the national central 
banks (EMU Treaty, 1991,Statute of the EMI). 
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and the desired values for these, the Council has to come up with attainable, realistic values for 
these targets. Indirectly, this implies, however, that the Council must also take care of the 
consequences the choice for certain target variables has on the related values for the instruments 
(which ultimately have to be set by the individual countries). If they are disproportional the 
individual countries will never commit themselves to these target variables. For these credibility 
reasons therefore, it seems reasonable that the Council, in the determination of the values for the 
targets, also takes the (weighted) desired instrumental variables of the individual countries into 
account. All these considerations mafce it plausible that the Council will come up with a set of 
values for the targets which are chosen such that the sum of weighted discrepancies between 
targets and instruments from their desired values is minimized. 
The next basic assumption in our model is that the optimal values for the coordinator's 
targets are transmitted to the individual countries, and that they influence the targets of the 
individual countries. 
The final step of our model is then, that we assume that all countries perform an optimizing 
behaviour. That is, we assume that all countries set their instruments such that weighted differen-
ces between actual and desired values for the targets as well as for the instruments are minimized. 
Formally, this results in the mathematical model of the following section. 
3 Theoretical framework 
Assumpt ion 3 .1 The dynamics of the economics of the individual countries are assumed 
to be described by (for i = 1 . . . N) : 
Vi(t) = Aiyi{t - 1) + Aoiy0(t - 1) + BiUiit) + Didi{t) (1) 
where y{(t) G 2Rn' is the state of the i-th subsystem (endogenous variables), u,-(t) G BC* is 
the control vector (instrumental variables) and the vector di(t) G iR*' is the purely exogenous 
data-vector. y0(t) G 2R"0 is the state of the coordinator-system. 
The dynamics of the Council (coördinator in the sequel) are described by : 
Vo(t) = A0y0(t - 1) + B0uQ(t) + D0d0{t) (2) 
where u0(t) and d0(t) are the fictive control vector resp. purely exogenous data vector of 
the coördinator. 
For all i, A{, Aoi, Bi and D{ are real matrices of appropriate dimensions. The same goes 
for Ao, BQ and DQ. 
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We assume that in order to achieve a certain objective y', fixed in advance as an ideal 
path, each policy maker chooses a control input u,. He will penalize any deviation of the 
targets from their desired paths. On the other hand, he likes to keep the control variables 
within a coherent range of values. This is done by also setting a desired path for the control 
vector, u*. With this idea in mind, we formulate a welfare loss function for each individual 
country. A simiiar welfare loss function is defined for the coördinator. The hierarchical 
control problem consists now of one control problem for the coördinator, which we call 
the center problem, and N control problems for the A^  subsystems, which we call the local 
problems. Formal our assumptions concerning this welfare loss minimization problems are : 
Assumpt ion3-2 (Center problem) 
t,-\ 
min Jo = min £ (\\y0(t) - y'0(t)\\2Qo(t) + \\u0(t) - tiS<*)|ft,W) (3) 
t=to 
w.r.t. (2). 
Assumption 3-3 (Local problem) 
min Jt = min £ (\\yi{t) - tf (*)]&(„ + I M ' ) " «*(0I&W) (*) 
' t=t0 
w.r.t. (1). 
In these definitions we have introduced the starting time to, which is a nonnegative integer, 
and the end time tf. We assume tf > tQ. The weight matrices Qi(t) and Qo(t) are assumed 
to be positive semi-definite. The weight matrices Ri(t) and Ro(t) are assumed to be positive 
definite. In this way we can garantuee that the resulting optimal control problems are all 
non-singular. 
The solutions of the above stated control problems can be derived using the maximum 
principle (see for instance de Zeeuw (1984) for details). First we solve the center problem. 
Theorem 3.4 The optimal control for the center problem as defined by 3.2 is given, for 
t = t0...tj - 1, by : 
ü0(t) = E0(t + l)-1 (Ro(tW) 
-
l
-BlKQ{t + l)[A0yQ(t - 1) + D0do(t)] - ^g0(t + 1)) (5) 
where Ko(t) satisfies, for t = t0...tf, the following backward Riccati dijference equation : 
f K0(t) = 2Q0{t - 1) + A$K0(t + 1) (/ - \BQEöl{t + \)B^KQ{t + 1)) A0 ( g ) 
1 K0(tj) = 2Q0(tf-l) 
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E0(t + 1) is defined, for t = t0 ... tj — 1, by 
1 T 
(10) 
E0(t + 1) := i2o(<) + -JS0J tf0(< + l)JBo (7) 
go(t) satisfies, for t = t0.. .tj, the following backward difference equation : 
go(t) = -2Q0(t - l)y5(t - 1) + A^K0(t + l)B0E^l(t + l ) / 2b (*K(0 
+A$K0{t + l)D0do{t) - \AoKQ{t + l)BoEö\t + l)B$Ko(t + 1)A>«4>(<) 
+A$go(t + 1) - i^ 0 A' 0 ( i + l)BQEêl{t + l)B^g0(t + 1) 
g0(tf) = - 2 g 0 ( « / - i ) y 5 ( < / - i ) 
(8) 
Next, we solve the JV local problems : 
T h e o r e m 3.5 The optimal control for the local problem as defined by 3.3 is given, for 
t — t0...tf,by: 
üi(t) = tf^ + l ) - 1 ( # ( * ) < ( * ) 
-
l
-BjKi{t + l){Aiyi(t - 1) + Aoiy0{t - 1) + A 4 ( * ) ] - | * f # ( < + 1)) (9) 
w/iere #,-(<) satisfies, fort = *,. . .tf-l, the following backward Riccati difference equation : 
f #,-(*) = 2Qi(t - 1) + A ? X ( * + 1) (ƒ - i ^ . ^ r 1 ^ + 1 ) # X ( ' + 1)) ^ 
\ Ki(tf) = 2Qi(tf - 1) 
Ei(t + 1) is defined, for t = <,-... tf — l, by : 
Ei(t + 1) := /?,( ') + \BjKi{t + 1)5,- (11) 
gi(t) satisfies, for t = t0.. .tf, the following backward difference equation : 
' gi(t) = -2Qi(t - l)y?(t - 1) + AfKi(t + l)fl,-£f *(* + l ) /2,-(*K(0 
+AjKi(t + 1) [Didi(t) -r Aoiy0(t - 1)] 
-\AiKi(t + \)BiETl{t + 1 ) 5 ? X ( * + 1) [£>,•<*.•(*) + i4o,-y0(< - 1)] (12) 
+Af9i(t + 1) - \AiKi(t + l ) ^ " 1 ^ + 1 ) ^ . 0 + 1) 
l *(*/) = -2Qi{tj-\)yt{tf-\) 
Below, we will present in Figure 1 a sununary of our hierarchical optimal control model. If the 
desired paths of the coördinator (y0* u0") and the d„ vector are given, we are able to solve the 
center problem for the simulation period. This gives optimal values for the coordinator's target and 
control vectors y0 and ü0 respectively. Then the coördinator transmits y0 to each subsystem, which, 
from the latter's point of view, is exogenous. Together with the desired paths of every subsystem, 
yj* and u," and the purely exogenous vector ds , all the N local problems can be solved for the 
planning period, which gives optimal values for each country's target and control vectors y; and u; 
respectively. 
Figure Stylized hierarchical optimal control model 
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4 Application on an econometrie model for the EC 
4.1 The model 
To analyse the optimal coordination in the European Community, Ito et al. (1991) 9 built an 
annual econometrie model which allows for the application of the theory being exposed above. The 
model is based on the COMET-V model (see Duerinck & d'Alcantara, 1988) for the Community. 
According to the previous sections we distinguish two levels of policy-making. 
The first level is the policy-making by the coördinator, the Council, which is an aggregate of 
the EC countries. The second level comprises the policy-making process by the individual EC 
countries. All EC countries are modelled with the exception of Luxembourg (left out because its 
GDP represents less than 0.2% of the EC's GDP). The model consists of 8 linear behaviourial 
equations for each country and for the coördinator. A defimtional equation for the current account 
of the balance of payments is also included. The specification of the vector of endogenous variables 
9
 The defïnitions and data-sources of the variables used in the model are given in Ito et al. 
(1991), Appendix A. 
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is given in Table 1. 
Table 1 Endogenous (Target) Variables 
CPO household consumption in constant '80prices 
n»o investment (other than residential or govemmental) in 
constant '80prices 
XTO total exports in constant '80prices 
MTO total imports in constant '80prices 
PY GDP's deflator ('80 = 100) 
UR unemployment rate 
FMD money stock in current prices 
PXT price index of total exports 
('80 = 100) 
TB current account balance 
A list of the instrumental variables used is given in Table 2. 
Table 2 Instrumental (Control) Variables 
SIR short term interest rate 
Lm long term interest rate 
EXR nominal exchange rate vis a vis the US dollar 
WGU compensation of employees of the general 
government in current prices 
NG total employment of the general government 
ITR indirect tax rate 
SSHR rate of social security contributions of house-
holds 
DTCR direct tax rate on companies' profits 
DTHR direct tax rate on households' income 
SUB subsidies in current prices 
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The purely exogenous data, i.e. the d0 (t) and d; (t) vectors in equation (1) and equation (2) 
occurring in this multicountry model are: disposable income, GDP in constant 1980 prices, gross 
operating surplus of companies, the price index of the competitors' weighted tradahle goods, the 
price index of imports and the total wage compensation of employees. 
Over the sample period, the values for the EC are obtained as an aggregation of the values 
of each country expressed in dollars, whereas the countnes' variables are measured in their 
national currency. The EC's values for the price indices, unemployment rates, interest rates, taxes 
and social security rates are calculated as a weighted sum of the values of each country. The 
population variables are, obviously, a simple sum of the variables. 
We now turn briefly to the model equations. On the EC level, each endogenous target 
variable is explained by (lagged) endogenous variables (y0), instrumental variables (u 0) and purely 
exogenous ones (d0 ). Mutatis mutandis this applies also for the individual countries. However, in 
the individual country equations the lagged coordinator's target values are introduced. In section 3 
eq. (1) this is represented by the y0 (t-1) vector, where the A^ matrix comprises the quantitative 
influence of these coordinator's (lagged) targets on each country's target variable. Because the 
variables of the coördinator are (weighted) sums of the individual country's variables, A^yo (t-1) 
represents also the economie linkages between the countries, albeit in an indirect way. 
To facilitate the comparison between the country models, we imposed a similar structure on 
them. First, this is reflected by explaining the same targets for each country by the same Instru-
ments and endogenous variables. For example, for each country the dollar exchange rate is 
considered an instrument that can be used to control the volume of exports. The same can be said 
of the interest rate being a policy instrument for the volumes of consumption and investment and 
for the money supply. 
Second, the similarity in the model structure is also reflected in the explicit coordinator's 
influence on the country's targets equations 10. We measured that influence by estimating the 
contribution of the coordinator's values for the current account balance (TB), real GDP, the GDP 
deflator (PY) and the unemployment rate (UR) to the appropriate country target variables. So we 
For example, the export price equation of Belgium is mainly explained by: 
PXT BEL = PXT BEL (EXR
 BF„ PY ,BEL ,PXT.,BEL, GDP ,BEL ; GDP ^ PY ,EC) . 
So if the Council would like to fight inflation, the rise in the price index PY ^ should decrease and would affect 
after one period the Belgian export prices. To keep with the same country, another example is the Belgian 
investment equation: 
JpO BEL _ j p Q BEL
 ( G D p BEL j p Q BEL p y B^EL y g BEL UR BEL . Q j j p EC IJR EC j 
The volume of Belgian investments is explained not only by its own variables, but also by the development of the 
GDP and the unemployment on the EC level, the latter two representing final demand opportunities within the 
EC area. 
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can split each country equation in two parts: the fïrst part consists of country variables while in the 
second part the coordinator's variables are added. 
Using macro-economie data over the sample period 1960-1986 for each country eq. (l)-(2) 
of section 3 have been estimated and tested (Ito et al., 1991). 
Before we can compute the hierarchical control solutions, we need desired paths for the 
target (endogenous) variables and the control variables. For the center problem we will discuss 
four ways how the desired paths for the target and control variables might come about. In what is 
called a Top-Down policy, we assume that the coördinator determines nis own desired paths. 
Another possibility is a Bottom-Up policy. the desired paths for the coördinator are calculated as 
the (weighted) sums of the desired paths of the subsystems. Further, in Ito et al. (1991) also a 
constrained Top-Down and a constrained Bottom-Up policy are defined. In the case of a constrained 
Top-Down policy the coördinator determines his own desired paths for the target variables but the 
desired paths for the control variables are calculated as in the Bottom-Up case. The constrained 
Bottom-Up policy works just the other way round: the coördinator determines the desired path for 
the control variables, and the desired paths for the targets are calculated as in the Bottom-Up case. 
More informative structures can be considered within the constrained policies (i.e., divide the 
control variables into groups, depending on the various possibilities the coördinator has to control 
these variables). Nevertheless, we have computed (only) the four types of information exchange 
explained above. 
The following scheme summarizes these types of information exchange: 
u 0 * = E o i U j * u0* 
y0* = E fi ; y" Bottom-Up Constrained 
Bottom-Up 
y0* Constrained Top-Down 
Top-Down 
where y„*and u0*are the coordinator's desired target and desired control vectors respectively, while 
y„*= EB j y * and uc*= E a ;U*are the same vectors but considered as a (weighted) sum of the 
subsystems' desired target and desired control vectors respectively. 
4.2 On the road to EMU 
In this section we will motivate the way we specified the desired paths for both the target and 
13 
instrumental variables. Our reference point will be stage three of the EMU Treaty ". It is well 
known that this stage includes the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates, leading to the introduction 
of a single currency. Further, a European central bank will be established which implies the 
conduct of a single monetary policy and exchange rate policy the primary objective of both shall be 
to maintain price stability (EMU Treaty, 1991). 
The desired paths are chosen in such a way that nearly all countries meet the monetary n 
convergence tests required to enter full monetary union. This implies that all countries are 
targeting converging (i.e., lowering!) inflation rates resulting in an inflation rate in 1995 (i.e.,the 
reference year of examination) which does not exceed that of at most the three best price 
performing member states by more than VA percentage points (EMU Treaty, 1991, Protocol on 
the convergence criteria). It is assumed that Gennany strives for an inflation rate of 2lA % during 
1987-1990 (which is close to the actual rate) and for 2% during 1991-1995,which reflects the desire 
by the Bundesbank (Schlesinger, 1992). Only for Greece and Portugal it is supposed that these 
countries do not wish to lower their inflation rates that far, because of their high initial inflation. 
Nevertheless, we assumed these two countries are striving for convergence too. The desired paths 
for the interest rates have been made consistent with the desired inflation for each country, 
according to the Fisher-relation. Here, also, the convergence criterion of the Treaty has been taken 
account of 13. As far as the growth of the money supply is concerned it is assumed that the 
desired money growth rates are gradually lowered, consistent with the lowering of the inflation 
rates and taking into account national differences in the growth of productive capacity. 
The desired exchange rate of the US dollar has been set in such a way that from 1991 on 
exchange rates between the countries participating in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) will 
be fixed at central parity. Intra-European exchange rate stability can of course coincide with 
different movements of the dollar. In this paper we suppose a constant dollar exchange rate vis a 
vis the EMS-bloc. For Greece and Portugal, which do not participate in the ERM '4, we assume 
that their exchange rates follow Purchasing Power Parity, as has roughly been the case over the last 
11
 Here it is not the right place to discuss the new political situation which emerged after the 
Danish no against the Maastricht Treaty. Nevertheless, one can be quite sure that Denmark 
does not have great difficulties with the application of the convergence criteria we are 
analyzing in this paper, because it already meets them. 
12
 In future research the convergence criteria relating to the fiscal variables (i.e. the govern-
ment deficit and the government debt) will be taken account of. 
13
 This criterion says that in 1995 the average long-term interest rate of a member state should 
not exceed that of the three best price-performing member states by more than 2% points 
(EMU Treaty, 1991, Protocol on the convergence criteria). 
14
 This analysis was done before Portugal joined the ERM on April 6, 1992. 
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ten years. 
We now tum to the variables of the coördinator. The Council, it is argued, is very keen to 
establish the full monetary union. Therefore, we assume that the EC desires the same low inflation 
and interest rates path as Gennany. The desired money supply growth rate of the EC has been set 
at 6%, reflecting desired inflation and assuming approximately a 4% growth in EC's productive 
capacity. 
Overseeing the coordinator's wishes, one can conclude a desire to perform as a second 
anchor, after Gennany, to ensure the road to EMU is a sound one. Aithough this is not a 
guarantee for price predictability in the sense of Friedman (1986), the coördinator might act as an 
extra safety valve. This opens up the possibility that, might Gennany take compromises on inflation 
because of internal and external political pressures, there is still a second, coordinating, monetary 
authority, making it diffïcult to raise the European inflation-anchor. 
As far as the other variables (e.g. unemployment) are concerned, we assume that their 
desired paths follow realistic trends, consistent with recent realizations and projections given by i e 
OECD (OECD, Economie Outlook, 1991). Further, the desired values for as well indirect and 
direct tax rates for households and companies as the social security contributions of households are 
kept constant. Finally, the purely exogenous variables are set according to realizations and projecti-
ons of the OECD. In sum, for the desired targets we tried to assume realistic and credible values, 
while at the same time retaining the neccesary monetary policies to meet the convergence tests. In 
Appendix A the most important desired paths of targets and instruments related to 1991-1995 are 
shown. 
The final step before computing me optimal solutions, is to attach weights to the target and 
control variables, according to the priority given by the policy-makers. Because of the importance 
to meet the convergence tests, we put a doublé penalty on deviations from the desired paths for 
inflation, exchange rates, interest rates and money supply, or formally: 
Q.*(t) = l /y j"(t)2withj = CPO, IPO, XTO, MTO, UR, PXT and 
Q.*(t) = 2/yj'*(t)2withj = PY, FMD; 
R,'(t) = l/u j " ( t)2 with j = WGU, NG, ITR, SSHR, DTCR, DTHR, SUB and 
Rj*(t) = 2/Uj*(t)2withj = SIR, LIR, EXR. 
Results 
In this section we present the results for the optimal paths of the target and instrumental variables 
for the simulation period 1987-1995, given the estimated model, the desired paths and the 
projections of the purely exogenous variables. 
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In Table 3 Theil inequality coefficients for the target variables are shown. We restrict 
ourselves to Top-Down and Bottom-Up solutions only, because the Constrained Top-Down and 
the Constrained Bottom-Up policies show optimal values similar to the Top-Down and the 
Bottom-Up solutions respectively. Theil-coefficients l5 measure the relative distance between the 
hierarchical optimal control solutions and the corresponding desired values. 
In general, Top-Down solutions appear substantially more efficiënt than Bottom-Up 
solutions. This clearly applies for France, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom, 
Denmark and Spain. The optimal values for their target variables track their desired paths quite 
well. The Theil coefficients are almost equal to or below 0.4,which is considered as a critical value. 
Only for Italy (CPO, IPO), Greece (FMD, PXT) and Spain (IPO, MTO, PY, FMD, PXT) the 
Theil coefficients are tbo high. 
Looking at the targets, in particular the variables for IPO and FMD show a high inequality 
value, especially in the Bottom-Up case. The lower performance of the optimal investment paths 
(IPO) may be related to the relatively low explanatory power of investment equations, which 
showed also up in the estimates. For FMD, even Top-Down inequality coefficients are rather high 
for Denmark, Ireland, Greece and Spain. For these last three countries, this is due to the imposed 
desired money growth rates of the EC-coordinator, which appear too restrictive for these countries. 
In this model, the money supply seems to be the most difficult variable to target. This appears to 
be quite general in practice. 
As far as inflation is concerned, it can be seen that all countries' optimal inflation paths are 
very close to their desired paths. This is remarkable because the coordinator's inflation targets in 
the Top-Down strategy has been rather restrictive (i.e.,an annual inflation rate of 2% in 1991-
1995). This implies that converging and lower inflation rates, as is required for entering the third 
stage of EMU, is attainable for a number of EC countries, provided the coördinator follows a tight 
(=Top-Down) policy. 
Optimal unemployment paths are close to the desired ones for nearly each country. Here, 
the low Theil coefficients imply that a tight monetary policy will not harm unemployment. On the 
contrary, the slightly declining unemployment rates we assumed to be the ideal policies until 1995 
appear to be attainable. We return to this issue in the next section. 
T _y/s>/;-4,>2 
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 Theil-coefficients are defined as ^ ; . . 
where a;, = optimal target/control variable 
a \ = desired target/control variable 
i = countries and coördinator 
t = 1987-1995 
Table 3 Theil inequality coefficients target variables 
LDB FR IT NL BE UK IR DK HE PO ES EC 
CPO 0.05 
0.05 
0.07 
0.24 
0.53 
0.84 
0.09 
0.40 
0.03 
0.05 
0.16 
0.05 
0.08 
0.09 
0.06 
0.11 
0.06 
0.03 
0.15 
O.iO 
0.21 
0.31 
0.06 
0.53 
IPO 0.32 
0.29 
0.05 
0.11 
0.52 
0.59 
0.19 
0.43 
0.21 
0.76 
0.12 
0.07 
0.44 
0.24 
0.29 
2.36 
0.09 
0.25 
0.18 
0.14 
0.55 
2.27 
0.19 
0.69 
XTO 0.09 
0.06 
0.20 
0.17 
0.26 
0.08 
0.06 
0.21 
0.07 
0.16 
0.13 
0.29 
0.06 
0.11 
0.07 
0.14 
0.35 
0.43 
0.67 
0.48 
0.25 
0.16 
0.08 
0.48 
MTO 0.25 
0.17 
0.16 
0.08 
0.30 
0.25 
0.04 
0.03 
0.15 
0.10 
0.15 
0.07 
0.38 
0.36 
0.12 
0.09 
0.03 
0.01 
0.12 
0.09 
1.34 
1.74 
0.09 
0.59 
PY 0.15 
0.08 
0.06 
0.17 
0.01 
0.13 
0.04 
0.46 
0.05 
0.17 
0.04 
0.12 
0.36 
0.21 
0.02 
0.05 
0.30 
0.26 
0.20 
0.16 
0.95 
1.61 
0.15 
0.03 
UR 0.00 
0.00 
0.09 
0.04 
0.04 
0.03 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.20 
0.25 
0.00 
0.02 
0.08 
0.04 
0.10 
0.08 
0.04 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
FMD 0.15 
0.12 
0.08 
0.04 
0.30 
0.65 
0.15 
0.49 
0.28 
0.44 
0.20 
1.56 
0.47 
0.16 
0.55 
0.85 
1.13 
1.48 
0.38 
0.49 
0.73 
0.48 
0.20 
0.50 
PXT 0.19 
0.10 
0.05 
0.12 
0.09 
0.23 
0.14 
0.25 
0.14 
0.36 
0.37 
0.56 
0.37 
0.61 
0.05 
0.17 
1.39 
1.88 
0.09 
0.14 
0.86 
1.35 
0.08 
0.07 
TB 0.05 
0.14 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
| 0.07 
0.00 
o.oe 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1 o.oo 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
Table 4 Theil inequality coefficients control variables 
DB FR IT NL BE UK IR DK HE PO ES EC 
SIR 0.22 
1.13 
0.02 
0.03 
0.01 
0.08 
0.14 
0.14 
0.36 
0.20 
LIR 0.08 
0.60 
0.03 
0.19 
0.05 
0.06 
0.21 
0.15 
0.12 
0.26 
0.23 
0.28 
0.28 
0.94 
EXR 0.07 
0.20 
0.06 
0.09 
0.05 
0.45 
0.07 
0.41 
0.11 
0.83 
0.41 
1.05 
0.07 
0.15 
0.21 
0.23 
0.37 
0.16 
0.39 
0.27 
0.31 
0.63 
WGU 0.18 
0.30 
0.73 
0.14 
0.34 
0.61 
0.25 
0.31 
0.05 0.14 
0.03 ' 0.50 
3.12 
3.17 
0.13 
0.10 
3.94 
1.92 
1.23 
0.23 
0.08 
0.11 
0.14 
0.04 
NG 0.01 
0.01 
0.17 
0.05 
0.00 ; 
0.00 ! 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.03 
0.15 
0.07 
0.01 
0.01 
0.04 
0.01 
ITR 0.30 
1.16 
0.31 
0.59 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 i ü.03 
0.03 | 0.02 
0.22 
0.16 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0.10 
0.16 
0.53 
1.01 
SSHR 0.00 1 
o.oo 1 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
DTCR 0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.02 
0.02 
0.04 
1 
i 
i 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.13 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
DTHR ! o.oo 
i o.oo 
0.00 
0.00 
SUB 0.02 
0.02 
0.03 
0.09 
0.00 i 
0.01 i 
0.22 
0.23 
0.02 
0.07 
0.02 
0.05 
lst: Top-Down (mon/mon) 
2nd: Bottom-Up 
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Looking at the Theil inequality coefficients for the control variables in Table 4, we observe 
in general the same pattern as in Table 3. Top-Down policies produce significantly more efficiënt 
solutions than Bottom-Up policies. In addition, the countries' Theil's coefficients are small. Only 
for the instrument WGU there are somewhat higher Theil values. 
We observe that the optimal paths for the interest rates and the exchange rates track their 
respective desired paths quite well. So a lot of countries show to be capable to keep to a rather 
restrictive path concerning those variables. Tbis is of course an important conclusion for the 
transition to the third stage of EMU. In fact, looking at the Top-Down solution in Figure 2 for a 
number of European exchange rates vis a vis the D-mark, the guilder, the Belgian and French 
franc, the lire and the Irish pound are keeping pretty well together. Moreover, for the guilder the 
ERM-criterion (i.e.,a maximum fluctuation margin against the D-mark of 2.25% on both sides of 
the central rate, which has been set in this figure at 100), is met. This is consistent with the de 
facto monetary union that exists between Germany and The Netherlands (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1990a). Most other currencies, i.e., the French franc, the lire and the 
Belgian franc show slightly depreciating tendencies vis a vis the D-mark, which is in accordance 
with their cumulated inflation differentials with Germany since 1991. The British pound shows a 
clear tendency to depreciate and starts, moreover, on a too high level. One should bear in mind, 
however, that the model has been estimated before the pound joined the ERM. In general, the 
results presented in Figure 2 are encouraging because the exchange rate was not considered as a 
target variable. If that would be the case, it could be steered within a narrow range, for instance by 
an interest rate policy or by exchange market interventions. 
In Table 5 we present results with respect to the square root of the sum of performance 
costs. Because we are interested in an overall measure per country, we analyzed the total costs of 
deviating from the desired target and control variables over the simulation period. This index 
measures the welfare loss which each country has to incur by applying a policy that differs from the 
ideal (desired) one. It is defined as: 
SRSPC, = ^tyCOVCO^M^COVCOÉU) 
Note that these indices cannot be compared with over countries, but only for different policies per 
country and for the EC coördinator. With the exception of Ireland, Greece and Portugal, it turns 
out that in all countries the welfare loss is the lowest if the coördinator follows a (constrained) 
Top-Down policy. This means that most countries are incurring the smallest costs if the EC as a 
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Opt i ma I exchange rates, Top-down 
ao I 1 1 . i 1 i_ 
1991 92 93 94 9S 
O f-f/dm -f lire/dm o f I / dm A bf/dm X bp/ dm V ip/öm 
Figure 2 Optimal exchange rates, Top-Down 
macroeconomic authority keeps to the tight monetary policy consistent with stage three of EMU. 
Equivalently, we can say that the costs of deviating from the ideal paths are greater for countries 
with a historical record of relatively low infiation rates l6 in the case the coördinator determines 
his desired paths as a weighted average of the subsystems' desired paths (i.e.,a Bottom-Up or a 
loose monetary policy). 
Further, it is interesting to note that for Ireland, Greece and Portugal a Bottom-Up 
approach is preferred. This implies that these countries are better off if the EC takes also into 
account less tight monetary policies. This outcome is closely related to the economically less 
advanced state of their economies, making it more difficult for them to track the more demanding 
path of the coördinator. We observe that Germany and The Netherlands have a strong preference 
for a Top-Down policy. This is due to the the fact that these countries' desired paths, to a great 
extent, coincide with the desired paths of the coördinator. For example, in monetary matters, as we 
have seen, both countries benefit from a low-inflation policy of the coördinator, and these results 
are obvious from Table 5. 
For the EC as a whole a constrained Bottum-Up policy is preferred. So the Community is 
incurring the smallest welfare loss if the individual countries transmit their desired targets to the 
coördinator, while the latter determines his own genuine desired evolution for the control variables. 
As a consequence, one could tentatively conclude that it is more efficiënt to let the Council decide 
16
 In particular Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark. 
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about the best value of his own macroeconomic instruments (like the interest rate - the ECU rate -
and some Community tax rates), while the countries should be invited to communicate their 
desired target paths. 
Table 5 Square root of the sum of performance costs 
Countries Top-Down Bot tom-Up Constrained 
Top-Down 
Constrained 
Bot tom-Up 
Germajiy 1.97 3.74 1.96 3.74 
France 1.04 1.82 1.04 1.81 
Italy 0.35 0.77 0.35 0.77 
Netherlands 0.86 5.92 0.87 5.94 
Belgium 0.41 1.50 0.42 1.49 
United Kingdom 0.46 0.83 0.46 0.83 
Ireland 1.86 1.40 1.85 1.40 
Denmark 0.75 1.34 0.75 1.33 
Greece 1.24 1.11 1.23 1.11 
Portugal 0.97 0.68 0.97 0.68 
Spain 3.00 4.11 2.98 4.12 
EC 2.22 2.07 2.7.9 1.17 
By way of example, we would like to analyze some results in more detail, since they may be 
of particular interest. The graphics of these examples can be found in Appendix B. 
First, Figure B.l shows the great difference between the optimal path under a Top-Down 
and under a Bottom-Up policy for the Dutch inflation rate. Apparently, the Dutch economy 
benefits most if the EC follows a low-inflation policy (i.e.,Top-Down) rather than to accommodate 
the EC's inflation average, which takes into account the higher inflation rates in Greece, Portugal, 
Spain, the UK and Italy. 
Second, Figure B.2 demonstrates the great inefficiency Germany encounters if the EC is 
foUowing a Bottom-Up interest rate policy, which reckons also with the higher interest rates in 
other EC countries. For the sake of an independent German monetary policy, it is in the interest 
of the Bundesbank to induce the EC to follow a restrictive monetary policy. However, if the EC 
would adopt a relatively accommodative monetary stance (i.e., Bottom-Up), it is optimal for 
Germany to raise its interest rates to a great extent in 1989-1990, and lower them afterwards, to 
reach exactly the desired 4% short-term interest rate in 1995. 
For Greece Figure B.3 shows that the way desired paths for the Council are specified, has a 
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negligible influence on the Greek optimal unemployment path. This is so because the Greek 
unemployment rate is of about the EC average. Only in 1995 there is some divergence of optimal 
paths. 
Finally, in marters related to the indirect tax rate, Germany is far better off with a Top-
Down policy by the coördinator (Figure B.4). According to our defmitions, the desired (constant) 
indirect taxes by the EC are of about the same rate as in Germany (28% resp. 25%) over the 
simulation period. However, most other neighbour countries prefer higher rates (e.g., Holland, 
France, the UK, Denmark). As a consequence, a Bottom-Up policy by the EC, which also takes 
into account the higher indirect tax rates, does not fit to the German situation because of its 
inefficiency. 
6 A Keynesian scenario for Europe 
In the previous section we presented results for the EC countries assuming almost ideal paths 
viewed from the perspective of the supporters of EMU. It was shown that most countries would 
benefit if the Council would pursue a tight monetary policy (instead of a loose policy). This 
conclusion is subject to the condition that the individual countries are following the "right" EMU 
policies too. However, there is insufficiënt reason why all countries should comply with the 
convergence tests at the same time. Each country has to decide if stage three is in its own interest. 
In this section, therefore, we are presenting another scenario, i.e. other desired paths for these 
individual countries. The main reason is to show what will happen in case the appropriate EMU 
policies are not pursued. By then, we will also have an idea about the sensitivity of the model 
outcomes for different desired paths. In addition, we will be able to show what rnacroeconomic 
role the coördinator has to play if the individual countries do not care much for EMU, while the 
coördinator does. As a consequence, there will be conflict between the Council's preferences and 
the countries'. It would be interesting to see what intervening potential, if any, the coördinator has 
to direct the countries to stage three. In addition, we will also analyze the situation when not only 
the countries, but also the coördinator pursues a Keynesian policy. So we will investigate two 
alternative scenario's. 
For the individual countries we assume they now prefer policies which are more Keynesian 
in nature, i.e. they aim for higher inflation and for lower unemployment rates. This translates into 
higher interest rates and requires of course more expansive money growth rates. We also assume 
the governments like to employ more ei vil servants (increase in NG). The total wage compensation 
of these employees (WGU), which is also lifted by higher inflation, has to be increased accordingly. 
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Because in the first scenario the Council still aims for the EMU within the given time schedule, we 
assume the same desired values for the coördinator as in section 4.2 (Appendix C shows these 
Keynesian desired paths). 
6.1 Results 
In this section we will emphasize the comparison of the EMU-scenario in section 4-5 with the two 
alternative scenario's. For ease of exposition, in the following we will denote the EMU-scenario as 
mon/mon, the first alternative scenario as mon/keyn and the second alternative as keyn/keyn ". 
The Theil inequality coeffïcients of these two scenario's are summarized in Tables 6 and 7. The 
first row for each variable represents the mon/keyn situation and the second row the keyn/keyn 
one. Let us first look at the situation where the Council follows EMU policies, while the countries 
pursue Keynesian policies (i.e. mon/keyn or the first alternative scenario). In this situation the 
Theil coefficients are relatively small. So for most countries and for most targets and instruments, 
the optimal paths are close to the desired paths. Exceptions are some coefficients in the investment 
and money stock equations, probably due to specification errors. In the second alternative scenario, 
the EC-coordinator follows a Keynesian policy too. This is. however, not implemented as in a Top-
Down transmission structure, but in a Bottom-up fashion1S (i.e. the desired paths of the Council 
are constructed taking the desired Keynesian policies of the EC countries as a weighted average). 
As can be seen, the Theil coefficients now are significantiy higher in several instances. This applies 
for the variables CPO, IPO, PY, FMD, PXT, SIR, LIR, EXR. Variables which seem less sensitive 
to different coordinator's policies are UR, TB, SSHR, DTCR, DTHR, SUB. In addition, it appears 
that for the coördinator targeting a Community-wide low unemployment rate (Bottom-Up) is as 
efficiënt as targeting a higher one (Top-Down). 
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 The type of policy of the coördinator precedes that of the individual countries. In tenns of 
the model's transmission structure of information, mon/mon and mon/keyn refer to Top-
Down policies of the coördinator while keyn/keyn refers to Bottom-up policies. 
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 In a related paper the situation is analyzed where the coördinator follows Keynesian policies 
in a Top-Down manner, irrespective of what policies the countries are pursuing (Weeren, 
Plasmans, Douven, VanderWal, Engwerda, 1992). 
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Table 6 Theil inequality coefficients target variables Table 7 Theil inequality coefTicients control variables 
! DB FR | IT NL BE UK IR DK HE PO ES j EC !| 
s 
I 
R 
0.12 
1.23 
0.12 
1.23 
0.03 
0.05 
0.03 
0.05 
0.01 
0.07 
0.01 
0.07 
0.13 
0.13 
0.13 
0.13 
0.33 
0.11 
0.33 
0.18 
L 
I 
R 
0.06 
0.48 
0.06 
0.49 
0.01 
0.13 
0.01 
0.12 
0.05 
0.04 
0.05 
0.04 
0.18 
0.13 
0.18 
0.13 
0.13 
0.28 
0.13 
0.28 
0.20 
0.25 
0.20 
0.25 
0.28 
0.86 
0.70 
0.42 
E 
X 
R 
0.06 
0.19 
0.06 
0.19 
0.05 
0.10 
0.05 
0.10 
0.04 
0.40 
0.04 
0.41 
0.07 
0.39 
0.07 
0.39 
0.10 
0.60 
0.10 
0.59 
0.40 
0.92 
0.40 
0.92 
0.07 
0.17 
0.07 
0.17 
0.24 
0.24 
0.24 
0.24 
0.40 
0.21 
0.40 
0.21 
0.22 
0.22 
0.22 
0.22 
0.29 
0.59 
0.29 
0.59 
W 
G 
U 
0.08 
0.20 
0.08 
0.21 
0.91 
0.15 
0.91 
0.15 
0.42 
0.51 
0.42 
0.51 
0.31 
0.37 
0.31 
0.37 
0.09 
0.07 
0.09 
0.07 
0.06 
0.33 
0.06 
0.33 
2.46 
3.30 
2.44 
3.25 
0.12 
0.10 
0.12 
0.10 
5.16 
2.53 
5.13 
2.47 
1.48 
0.18 
1.48 
0.18 
0.13 
0.16 
0.13 
0.16 
0.14 
0.06 
0.12 
0.07 
N 
G 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.19 
0.05 
0.19 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.03 
0.04 
0.03 
0.15 
0.06 
0.15 
0.06 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.04 
0.02 
0.04 
0.02 
I 
T 
R 
0.27 
1.06 
0.27 
1.06 
0.33 
0.70 
0.33 
0.70 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.03 
0.01 
0.03 
0.04 
0.02 
0.04 
0.02 
0.20 
0.15 
0.20 
0.15 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.09 
0.15 
0.09 
0.15 
0.53 
0.81 
1.30 
0.31 
S 1 S 
H 
R 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
D 
T 
C 
R 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.02 
0.05 
0.02 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.14 
0.03 
0.14 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 i 
0.01 1 
D 
T 
H 
R 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
! 
S 
' r 
B 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.03 
0.09 
0.03 
0.09 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.23 
0.23 
0.23 
0.23 
0.02 | 
0.07 1 
0.02 i 
0.07 i 
0.02 
0.06 
0.02 
0.06 
| j DB ! FR IT J NL J BE_[ UK | IR | DK | HE | PO | ES | EC | 
C | 0.06 
P -1 0.06 
O | 0.06 
1 0.06 
0.07 
0.25 
0.07 
0.25 
0.51 
0.86 
0.51 
0.86 
0.11 
0.42 
0.11 
0.42 
0.03 
0.05 
0.03 
0.05 
0.15 
0.05 
0.15 
0.05 
0.08 
0.08 
0.08 
0.08 
0.04 
0.12 
0.04 
0.12 
0.06 
0.04 
0.06 
0.04 
0.06 
0.12 
0.06 
0.12 
0.21 
0.32 
0.21 
0.32 
0.06 
0.53 
0.06 
0.51 
I 
P 
O 
0.32 
0.27 
0.32 
0.27 
0.05 
0.1.1 
0.05 
0.12 
0.51 
0.59 
0.51 
0.59 
0.20 
0.43 
0.19 
0.43 
0.20 
0.80 
0.21 
0.80 
0.12 
0.06 
0.12 
0.06 
0.49 
0.23 
0.49 
0.23 
0.25 
2.86 
0.25 
2.84 
0.11 
0.26 
0.11 
0.26 
0.18 
0.13 
0.19 
0.12 
0.57 
2.70 
0.57 
2.71 
0.19 
0.60 
0.24 
0.60 
"xf 
T ! 
O j 
1 
0.09 
0.06 
0.09 
0.06 
0.20 
0.17 
0.20 
0.17 
0.24 
0.07 
0.24 
0.06 
0.05 
0.20 
0.05 
0.20 
0.07 
0.14 
0.07 
0.14 
0.13 
0.28 
0.13 
0.28 
0.06 
0.12 
0.06 
0.12 
0.08 
0.15 
0.08 
0.15 
0.35 
0.43 
0.35 
0.43 
0.54 
0.34 
0.54 
0.34 
0.21 
0.12 
0.21 
0.12 
0.08 
0.47 
0.07 
0.47 
M ; 
T .! 
O • 
l 
0.27 
0.18 
0.27 
0.18 
0.15 
0.08 
0.15 
0.08 
0.31 
0.27 
0.31 
0.27 
0.04 
0.03 
0.04 
0.03 
0.14 
0.10 
0.15 
0.10 
0.15 
0.07 
0.15 
0.07 
0.37 
0.36 
0.37 
0.36 
0.12 
0.08 
0.12 
0.08 
0.03 
0.02 
0.03 
0.02 
0.10 
0.12 
0.10 
0.12 
1.17 
1.60 
1.17 
1.59 
0.09 
0.61 
0.09 
0.59 
P 
Y 
0.12 
0.05 
0.12 
0.05 
0.08 
0.20 
0.08 
0.20 
0.01 
0.13 
0.01 
0.13 
0.00 
0.43 
0.00 
0.43 
0.02 
0.14 
0.02 
0.14 
0.06 
0.10 
0.06 
0.10 
0.32 
0.19 
0.32 
0.19 
0.03 
0.04 
0.03 
0.04 
0.27 
0.24 
0.28 
0.25 
0.20 
0.18 
0.20 
0.18 
0.91 
1.58 
0.90 
1.58 
0.15 
0.02 
0.15 
0.03 
U 
R 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.09 
0.04 
0.09 
0.04 
0.04 
0.03 
0.04 
0.03 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.18 
0.24 
0.18 
0.24 
0.00 
0.02 
OM 
0.02 
0.05 
0.03 
0.05 
0.03 
0.08 
0.08 
0.08-
0.08 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
F 
M 
D 
0.10 
0,06 
0.10 
0.06 
0.06 
0.07 
0.06 
0.08 
0.32 
0.67 
0.33 
0.67 
0.10 
0.42 
0.10 
1 0.42 
0.22 
0.35 
0.22 
0.35 
0.12 
2.37 
0.12 
2.40 
0.43 
0.16 
0.43 
0.15 
0.46 
0.76 
| 0.46 
i 0.75 
0.91 
1.22 
0.91 
1.22 
0.28 
0.36 
0.28 
0.36 
0.68 
0.41 
0.67 
0.40 
0.20 
0.52 
0.22 
0.22 
P 
X 
T 
i 
0.22 
0.13 
; 0.22 
:
 0.13 
0.05 
0.12 
0.05 
0.12 
0.11 | 0.14 
0.26 0.25 
0.11 | 0.14 
! 0.26 i 0.25 
0.13 
0.34 
0.12 
0.34 
0.35 
0.54 
1 0.35 
i 0.54 
0.36 ! 0.05 
0.65 i 0.21 
0.36 0.05 
0.64 0.21 
1.37 
1.87 
1.37 
1.85 
0.06 
0.19 
0.06 
0.19 
0.80 
1.35 
0.80 
1.34 
0.08 
0.10 
0.08 
0.09 
| •• 0 . 0 5 
j T 0.13 
B
 : 0.05 
Ü.13 
0.00 I 0.00 i 0.02 
0.00 j 0.00 i 0.06 
1 0.00 j 0.00 i 0.02 
i 0.00 | 0.00 0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
001 
0.00 | 
0.01 
lst: Top-down (mon/keyn) 
2nd: Bottom-up (keyn/keyn) 
3rd: Constrained Top-down 
4th: Constrained Bottom-up 
23 
Let us look more closely to the behaviour of inflation. It can be seen that the majority of EC 
countries is closer to the desired, Keynesian, inflation rates if the coördinator follows tight (=Top-
Down) monetary policies. Would the coördinator instead shift to the same expansive Keynesian 
policies as the individual countries (i.e. keyn/keyn), inflation rates in the EC are pushed up above 
their targets. Moreover, the Theil coeffïcients regarding EXR reveal that these keyn/keyn policies 
result in devaluations of several EMS currencies against the D-mark. In other words, if not only 
the Gennan anti-inflation anchor, but also that of the coördinator is raised, it appears very difftcult 
to return even to "Keynesian" inflation rates; at the same time EMS exchange rate stability 
decreases. These results imply that the Council's policies have substantial impact on the inflation 
performance of the individual countries. We can conclude that, in this hierarchical framework, the 
Council mitigates inflation. Figures 3 to 8 in Appendix D illustrate this too. Here, for four big and 
two small countries the optimal inflation rates under each type of policy is shown. The general 
result emerging from these figures is that mon/mon policies produce the lowest inflation. The next 
lowest are mon/keyn policies while the keyn/keyn scenario generates the highest inflation rates. To 
put it differently: a country's shift to Keynesian policies produce higher inflation, given unchanged 
policies of the coördinator; and a shift to Keynesian policies of the coördinator generate higher 
inflation too, given unchanged policies of the countries: This conclusion should be accompanied by 
some comments. 
First, for France the picture is different. If the Council follows a Keynesian policy too, this 
results in 199.1, as one would expect, in the highest inflation rate for the three scenario's. However, 
the next year inflation plunges to zero while in the rest of the planning period it keeps below the 
optimal inflation paths of the other two scenario's. 
Second, in general the inflation difference between the mon/mon and the mon/keyn 
scenario's is smaller than between one of these and the keyn/keyn one. This is illustrated for 
France, the Netherlands and Belgium. This is mainly due to the fact that the countries' desired 
inflation rates in the mon/keyn setting, although uniformly higher, have more in common with the 
ideal inflation rates in the mon/mon scenario. One should bear in mind that in the keyn/keyn 
scenario desired inflation of the Council takes into account relatively high inflation rates in Italy, 
the United Kingdom, Portugal and Spain. This exogenous effect works through in the model's 
structural equations where inflation of the EC area is an explanatory variable. 
Third, inflation rates in Germany confirm the general pattern sketched above. However, 
Gennan prices increase at a faster rate than in some other countries (like the Netherlands and 
France). After 1993, in the mon/mon scenario the inflation rate levels off, while in the expansive 
keyn/keyn case inflation still continues. 
Equally as interesting is the performance of different policies with respect to unemployment. 
As we saw in Table 6, Theil unemployment coeffïcients for each of the four different structures of 
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information transmission do not differ much per country (probably with the exception of France). 
This implies that individual nations can attain their ambitious employment targets quite irrespective 
of which policy the Council implements. So we can conclude that the impact of the Councü's 
policies is much greater as far as the fight against inflation is concerned. Optimal unemployment, 
however, is sensitive to different countries' policies. This is illustrated in Figures 9 to 14 in 
Appendix E where we compare mon/mon with mon/keyn policies for four big and two small 
countries. We observe that optimal unemployment paths in both scenario's are very close to their 
desired evolution. This applies in particular to Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
Italy and (after 1991) Germany. Further we note that policies to lower unemployment (i.e. 
countries follow Keynesian instead of EMU policies) are effective for all countries. In other words, 
if countries prefer lowêr unemployment rates, they willachieve them. 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper we presented preliminary results of the macroeconomic effects of different policy 
coordination schemes within the European Community. In doing so, we used a hierarchical optimal 
control framework. We argue that this alternative approach to the coordination issue in Europe 
may suit as a first approximation to evaluate the EC's stratifïed decision-making process. Since, at 
this moment, it is not clear how the Council together with the European Commission determine 
desired values for their targets as well as for their instrumental variables, we presented the 
simulation results for four different information transmission schemes, ranging from a Top-Down 
to a Bottom-Up information structure. 
Also in another sense this approach might be considered as useful. Common "intergo-
vernmental" coordination devices have a noncommittal character. As a result, dishonest behaviour 
of individual nations cannot be excluded, and therefore jeopardizes the welfare gains of policy 
cooperation. On the contrary, in hierarchical control models there is a separate coördinator who is 
responsible for the economie performance of the aggregate. This implies that also the absolute 
dimension of policy coordination is taken care of. In the underlying econometrie model this 
dimension was incorporated by letting the countries' endogenous variables also depend upon the 
targets of the Council. 
Because it is conceivable that in the near future more macroeconomic instruments will be 
available at the level of the Council casu quo the European Central Bank, we placed some 
instruments at the coordinator's disposal. Notwithstanding the "hierarchical" nature of this 
approach, the Council implements his policies in a market-conform way. We deliberately avoided 
any command pressure from the 'higher' to the 'lower' authorities. Also, we did not touch, and did 
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not model, the political aspect of empowering the Council with macroeconomic instruments. If 
some countries are anxious about more power at "Brussels",this willhave to be taken into account 
in their welfare loss functions. 
The main conclusion, which gives at the same time an answer to the problem posed in this 
paper is, that the EC, acting as a separate coördinator, has an important, independent, macroeco-
nomic role to play in the transition to the third stage of EMU. This applies in particular to 
monetary variables like inflation, nominal interest rates, exchanges rates and the money supply. We 
found that, for most EC countries, the convergence tests can be met if the Council follows a Top-
Down policy, i.e. a tight monetary policy, instead of a Bottom-Up policy which targets the average 
inflation in the EC. In particular, results of the EMU-scenario show that the optimal values of 
inflation rates, interest rates and exchange rates of the major European countries converge. This 
implies that stage three is, in principle, attainable for these countries. As could be expected, the 
less rich member states prefer less restrictive policies (i.e.,a Bottom-Up approach). In the EMU-
scenario it was further shown that restrictive monetary policies are consistent with achieving a 
reasonable economie growth and slightly declining unemployment rates in most European 
economies. The view that policies to meet the convergence criteria would have contractionary 
effects, is therefore not supported. 
If instead the coördinator pursues Keynesian policies, just like the countries do (i.e. the 
keyn/keyn scenario), the importance of this coördinator becomes more pregnant. We found in that 
case that the convergence criteria to enter full monetary union are out of range for all countries. 
So this underlines the potential anchor-function of the Council. If, on the other hand, the Council 
follows a sound anti-inflationary monetary policy for the whole EC-area, our results indicate this 
policy is capable to mitigate inflationary impulses stemming from Keynesian national policies (i.e. 
the mon/keyn scenario). Within this framework, we conclude therefore that the coordinator's 
policies in the monetary field are of substantial influence on the countries' abilities to move to the 
final stage of EMU. 
In contrast, this kind of "counterveiling power" is almost absent for most countries regarding 
unemployment targeting. We found that, no matter what policy the coördinator implements, it were 
the countries themselves which have by far the greatest impact on their own desired unemployment 
targets. 
A limitation of this approach is that only indirect economie interactions between the 
countries are modelled. Because this does not fit with reality, research is planned to weaken this 
assumption. It will also be fruitful to improve this coordination approach by refining the model 
(e.g. including a budget constraint and government debt variables) as well as introducing dynamic 
game theory. These extensions will be discussed in subsequent papers. 
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Appendix A Desired Paths for the EMU Scenario 
In this appendix the desired paths for the more important variables in the EMU scenario are 
shown lifce inflation (PY), unemployment (UR), the (growth rate of the) money stock (FMD), the 
short-term interest rate (SIR), the long-term interest rate (LIR), the US-dollar exchange rates 
(EXR), the wage compensation of government employees (WGU) and the total employment at the 
general government (NG). Although the planning period is 1986-1995, we omitted below the years 
1986-1990 because for that subperiod we assumed realized values instead of typical scenario values 
(which start from 1991). 
a) GDP's deflator (PY): 
DB FR IT NL BE UK 
1991 2 24 54 2 3 54 
1992 2 24 5 2 24 5 
1993 2 2 44 2 24 44 
1994 2 2 4 2 2 4 
1995 2 2 34 2 2 34 
b) Unemployment (UR): 
DB FR IT NL BE UK 
1991 5.3 6 6 6 7 64 
1992 5 5 5 5 6 54 
1993 5 5 5 5 54 54 
1994 44 5 5 44 54 54 
1995 4 5 5 4 5 54 
IRL DK HE PO ES EC 
44 34 13 11 54 2 
4 3 12 10 5 4. 
34 24 11 9 44 2 
3 2 10 8 4 2 
24 2 9 7 34 2 
IRL DK HE PO ES EC 
11 5.1 54 54 12 8.9 
94 5 5 5 10 9 
94 5 5 5 10 9 
94 5 5 44 94 84 
94 5 5 4 9 8 
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c) Money Stock (FMD, growth rate): 
DB FR IT NL BE UK IRL DK HE PO ES EC 
1991 5 44 74 6 6 84 84 lh 16 14 84 6 
1992 5 44 7 6 6 8 8 1 15 13 8 6 
1993 5 44 7 6 6 8 74 64 14 12 74 6 
1994 5 44 64 6 6 74 7 6 13 11 7 6 
1995 5 44 64 6 6 74 64 6 12 10 64 6 
d) Short-term Interest Rate (SIR): 
DB FR IT NL BE UK IRL DK HE PO ES EC 
1991 6 64 94 6 7 94 84 74 17 15 94 6 
1992 54 6 84 54 6 84 74 64 154 134 84 54 
1993 5 5 74 5 54 74 64 54 14 12 74 5 
1994 44 44 64 44 44 64 54 44 124 104 64 44 
1995 4 4 54 4 4 54 44 4 11 9 54 4 
e) Long-term Interest Rate (LIR): 
DB FR IT NL BE UK IRL DK HE PO ES EC 
1991 8 84 114 8 9 114 104 94 19 17 114 8 
1992 74 8 104 74 8 104 94 84 174 154 104 74 
1993 7 7 94 7 74 94 84 74 16 14 94 7 
1994 64 64 84 64 64 84 74 64 144 124 84 64 
1995 6 6 74 6 6 74 64 6 13 11 74 6 
f) US-Dollar Exchange Rates (EXR): 
DB FR IT NL BE UK 
1991 1.66 5.64 1241 1.87 34.16 0.57 
1992 1.66 5.57 1242 1.87 34.24 0.56 
1993 1.66 5.57 1242 1.87 34.24 0.56 
1994 1.66 5.57 1242 1.87 34.24 0.56 
1995 1.66 5.57 1242 1.87 34.24 0.56 
IRL DK HE PO ES EC 
1991 0.62 6.4 182.06 144.35 103.93 0.81 
1992 0.62 6.33 200.27 155.9 107.9 0.81 
1993 0.62 6.33 218.29 166.81 107.9 0.81 
1994 0.62 6.33 235.75 176.82 107.9 0.81 
1995 0.62 6.33 252.25 185.67 107.9 0.81 
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g) Wage Compensation of Government Employees (WGU): 
DB FR IT NL BE UK IRL DK HE PO ES EC 
1991-1995: increases yearly with national rates of inflation (ad a) 
h) Total Employment at the General Government (NG) 
DB FR IT NL BE UK IRL DK HE PO ES EC 
1991-1995: no increase in numbers since 1990 
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Appendix B Some countries' results 
holland,py 
I 
1
 ' riesirprl ' ( i i i top-down 
constr. top-down 
constr. bottom-up 
bottom-up 
2.5 -
/ 
/ ' 
/ 
2 
y 
1.5 
,.,-"' 
,-"' 
. " 
1 
i i i i • ' 
-
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
germany.si 
20 
15 
g 
§ 
10 
desired np 
top-down 
constr. top-down 
constr. bottom-up 
bottom-up 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
32 
3 
13 greece.ur 
9 -
7-
- ••" 1 1 
' riesirpd i i i 
top-üown 
constr. top-down 
constr. bottora-up 
bottom-up 
\ 
< 
:'• 
/ 
• 1 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
B 4 germany.itr 
b 
B 
8 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
. desired 
top-down 
constr. top-down 
constr. bottom-up 
bottom-up 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
33 
Appendix C Desired Paths for the Keynesian Scenario 
In this appendix desired Keynesian paths for those variables are shown which are different from 
the EMU scenario, i.e. the rate of inflation (PY), unemployment (UR), the (growth rate of the) 
money stock (FMD), the short-term interest rate (SIR), the long-term interest rate (LIR), the 
wage compensation of govemment employees (WGU) and the total employment at the general 
govemment (NG). 
a) GDP's deflator (PY): 
DB FR IT NL BE UK IRL DK HE PO ES EC 1} 
1991-1995 
yearly: +4% +4% +6% +4% +4% +6% +5% +4% +13% +11% +6% +5.03% 
b) Unemployment (UR): 
DB FR IT NL BE UK IRL DK HE PO ES EC » 
1991 5 6 6 6 7 64 11 5 54 54 12 6.36 
1992 44 54 54 5 6 54 10 44 5 5 10 5.61 
1993 4 5 5 44 5 5 9 4 44 44 9 5.05 
1994 34 44 44 4 44 44 8 34 4 4 8 4.51 
1995 3 4 4 34 4 4 7 3 34 34 7 3.96 
c) Money Stock (FMD, growth rate): 
DB FR IT NL BE UK IRL DK HE PO ES EC X) 
1991-1995 
yearly: +7% 64% 84% 7% 7% 9% 74% 64% 19% 17% 9% 7.89% 
Calculated as a weighted average (i.e. Bottom-Up policy) 
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d) Short-term Interest Rate (SIR): 
DB FR IT NL BE UK IRL DK HE PO ES EC 1} 
1991/ 
1995 6 64 94 6 7 94 84 74 17 15 94 7.88 
e) Long-term Interest Rate (LIR): 
DB FR IT NL BE UK IRL DK HE PO ES EC X) 
1991/ 
1995 8 84 114 8 9 114 104 94 19 17 114 9.88 
g) Wage Compensation of Government Employees (WGU): 
DB FR IT NL BE UK IRL DK HE PO ES EC X) 
1991-1995 
yearly: +44% 44% 64% 44% 44% 64% 54% 44% 134% 114% 64% 5.53 
h) Total Employment at the General Government (NG) 
DB FR IT NL BE UK IRL DK HE PO ES EC 15 
1991-1995 
yearly: +4% +4% +4% +4% +4% +4% +4% +4% +4% +4% +4% +4% 
Calculated as a weighted average (i.e. Bottom-Up policy) 
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Appendix D Inflation rates under three policy scenario's 
Figure 3 Optimal inflation in BeSgium 
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Figure 4 Optimal inflation in Germany 
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Figure 5 Optima) inflation in France 
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Figure 6 Optimal inflation in Italy 
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Figure 7 Optimal inflation in The Netherlands 
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Figure 8 Optimal inflation in the United Kingdom 
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Appendix E Unemployment rates under two policy scenario's 
Figure 9 Desired and optimal unemployment in Belgium 
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Figure 10 Desired and optimal unemployment in Germany 
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Figure 11 Desired and optimal unemployment in France 
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Figure 12 Desired and optimal unemployment in Italy 
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Figure 13 Desired and optimal unemployment in The Netherlands 
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Figure 14 Desired and optimal unemployment in the United Kingdom 
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